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Abstract 
Though the foundation of the Roman Empire is considered by some to be in 27 BC with Octavian’s 
acceptance of the name Augustus, its origins were in fact in the late 3rd Century BC with Rome’s 
involvement in the Second Punic War.  The nearly 20 year war pitched Rome against Carthage in what 
became a turning point in Roman history.  Rome would undergo economic changes that led to the 
establishment of the practice of Roman aristocrats paying extra costs of the war in an exemption of military 
service.  During the war, Rome’s armies were active farther abroad for greater lengths of time than 
previous wars.  As a result, recruitment underwent changes relaxing previous laws and customs of who 
could be recruited and greater power and independence was given to generals in forming their own armies.  
Additionally, the most successful Roman general during the war, Scipio Africanus, achieved unprecedented 
individual power both in the field, including an indefinite term as general and nearly complete diplomatic 
freedom, and at home, such  as breaking through the normal political requirements for multiple political 
positions.  Lastly, Rome won large sums of land and money from the victory that formed the beginnings of 
a territorial empire and brought Rome into further contact with other kingdoms; creating nearly 
unavoidable conflict, and leading to even further expansion.  These economic, military, and political 
precedents that occurred during the Second Punic War are all studied through the primary use of the ancient 
historian Livy, who is most qualified for the task.     
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 The Roman Empire’s rise is sometimes seen as all too inevitable, almost 
guaranteed, but even more so it is often narrated as a fluid process where victory 
continuously expanded the empire at a similar pace as Roman opponents were 
progressively in Rome’s path of expansion.  All Roman victories were not equal 
however, and some indicate radical turning points in the ebb and flow of Roman history.  
One such turning point is the Second Punic War when the Romans came face to face with 
Hannibal at the gates while stationing forces farther abroad than ever before and for 
longer durations.  The dire strain put on by the 16 year war with fighting in Italy for 
nearly the war’s entirety forced Roman transformations in both its economy and military 
practices.  It also provided the perfect setting for political figures to achieve 
unprecedented powers.  Rome began the war with influence limited to Italy and some of 
the nearby islands, but would emerge with claims in Spain and Greece and experience in 
Africa and Gaul.  It was this war that was the decisive struggle in which Rome would 
emerge as the Mediterranean’s foremost power.   
 The primary source for this study of the Second Punic War is Livy, whose Ab 
Urbe Condita was a massive attempt to give the Romans a systematic history from the 
foundation of Rome to the contemporary reign of Augustus.  From study of modern 
scholarship, it was determined that although using Livy presents a few qualifications that 
must be considered for his use, he is the most useful account for the Second Punic War 
because of the reliability of his sources contemporary to the war, his working knowledge 
of the Roman political system, and his fortunate place in history to see the full results of 
the decline of the Republic, while still remembering it fondly.  As a result, this thesis 
study uses Livy’s account to cite and analyze a number of significant changes as part of 
Rome’s turning point.  Modern scholarship is used to support this analysis providing 
academic investigation on the cited events to reveal a more detailed and critical 
understanding of where modern historians stand on the raised issues.  These instances 
examined are then compared to earlier Roman history, especially the First Punic War, to 
establish the precedence of the events primarily by use of modern scholarship.  Now 
established as precedents, the events of the Second Punic War are then compared to 
Roman history following the Second Punic War, with a specific focus on the dramatic 
events of the late Republic.  For this study, the use of the term late Republic refers to the 
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events traditionally cited as the final decline and fall of the Republic beginning with the 
election of Tiberius Gracchus to tribune in 133 BC and concluding with the recognition 
of Augustus in 27 BC.  The primary source Plutarch is used for this comparison 
whenever possible and is further supplemented with modern scholarship.  Additionally, 
this thesis is written assuming the reader has an at least general working knowledge of 
the Second Punic War.  Thus it is by an overall comparing and contrasting of the Second 
Punic War relative to the Republic’s history before and after the conflict that provide the 
evidence for citing this as the Roman turning point in the Mediterranean.   
The elements of this turning point generally fall into changes in the Roman 
economy, military, political structure, and territorial holdings.  The first set of precedents 
regard the Roman economy.  Roman financing during portions of the war relied on 
private funding from Rome’s commercial middle class being utilized on a grand scale for 
military purposes leading to grants of exemption to recruitment for the donors.  This 
would later have dramatic effects on Roman political interest groups in the last century of 
the Republic.  This change in finances also allowed for an overhaul of Roman currency, 
resulting in the system that was utilized for nearly five centuries of Roman rule.  
Additionally, Livy highlights elements that illustrate Rome’s changing military and 
recruitment methods.  As a result of the challenges associated with Roman armies 
spending longer continuous terms stationed abroad, especially as the war’s focus moved 
from Italy to Spain to Africa, and the significant drain the war had on Roman manpower, 
recruitment methods were altered to meet these challenges.  Similar methods can be seen 
employed with more permanence in the late Republic’s armies.  Also similar to the late 
Republic, the Second Punic War illustrates for the first times the power a successful 
general could achieve with the growing support of his soldiers.  This successful general 
was Scipio Africanus who ultimately becomes the focus of Livy’s narrative as the Roman 
failures of the war led up to his grand actions in bringing the war to a close.  His actions 
led to him being granted long term commands first in Spain and then in Africa with 
unparalleled independence allowing fuller diplomatic powers during his command and 
later political power after his command.  This power extends to the point that he is able to 
challenge the senate and even the political structure as a whole.  Thus Scipio is among 
the first of the powerful and dynamic men that led Rome on the path of the great 
3 
 
generals.  It was all of these precedents and changes during the Second Punic War which 
would forever change the course of Roman history.   
Livy: The Source of Rome’s Turning Point 
Livy was born in the Transpadane Gallic city of Patavium just outside the 
provincial borders of Italy in 59 BC, according to Saint Jerome.  Saint Jerome is believed 
to have been 5 years off in his estimate of Livy’s birth and death, however, which would 
put Livy’s birth at 64 BC.1  The region is said to have been known for its conservative 
morals reflecting older days of Roman virtue.  Though it is not specifically known when 
he first moved to Rome and began writing it was at the very least within a few years of 
the start of the rule of Augustus that Livy set out writing a 142 book history of Rome 
from the foundation of the city to his present day.  Of particular note, Livy’s limited 
travel meant he never served as a part of the Roman military and lacked a large amount 
of geographical travel which can be seen in his work.  Ultimately, Livy wrote for nearly 
40 years in Rome until he retired to Patavium possibly finishing a few books there until 
his death in 17 BC if Saint Jerome’s claim of 12 BC is once again adjusted.2   
Livy used a number of sources throughout his history, but his typical 
methodology of writing involved the use of a single primary source to build his own 
narrative from while supplementing with other sources as needed.  The primary source 
for the Second Punic War is debated though it is generally agreed the Greek historian 
Polybius is used as this primary source at least for the later portion of the war, especially 
for the events in Greece and Africa.  The argument against Polybius’s use is that the 
books about the Second Punic War appear more balanced in their geographic focus than 
the 15 books immediately after the war that, which focuses nearly entirely on events in 
Greece.  The comparison between the overall geographic focus leads some to believe the 
account of the Second Punic War used a greater mix of sources.  However, evidence 
indicates Livy’s account of events ranging from Hannibal’s march to Italy, Scipio’s 
capture of Carthago Nova, and even the Battle of Zama indicate very similar content to 
                                                            
1 Ogilvie, R. M. A Commentary on Livy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. P. 2 
2 Walsh, P. G. Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961. p. 1‐19 
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Polybius’s, and thus it is likely a safe assumption Polybius was one of Livy’s main 
sources.3   
Polybius was a Greek soldier and politician who when exiled to Rome in 168 or 
167 BC set about writing his Histories, which concerned Rome from 264 – 146 BC.  His 
40 book account states his motives are to analyze Rome’s swift rise to power as well as 
provide a handbook of sorts on the proper actions of a political and military leader.4  
Polybius is especially influential to Livy because he is the only apparent source used by 
Livy that utilized the accounts of the Greek literary companions of Hannibal, Silenus and 
Sosylus, though some claim Livy would have had direct access to them.  Polybius use as 
the main source for Livy offers a further potential advantage in that it is well known that 
Polybius was friends with Scipio Aemilianus, adopted grandson and great nephew of 
Scipio Africanus.  Though it can not necessarily be confirmed as Polybius does not cite 
any instances, it is a possibility the younger Scipio could have shed details on his adopted 
father especially in light of the fact that Aemilianus would later become a second Scipio 
Africanus.  This being said Livy does offer the advantage over Polybius in that Livy had 
a working knowledge of Rome’s political system and would have had a much more 
nuanced understanding of significant events that would have occurred politically.  This 
can be best illustrated by Livy’s often extensive explanation around the seeking of 
triumph’s by generals, which is often very briefly mentioned by Polybius.5  This 
usefulness is furthered by the known use of his supplementing sources.   
The Roman accounts of Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus, both 
contemporaries of the war, as well as Coelius Antipater, Claudius Quadrigrius, and 
Valerius Antias, who all wrote between the war and Livy’s time, are used as 
supplemental sources.  Some theorize that Livy only cites Fabius and Cincius through the 
three later accounts, but this cannot be completely confirmed as none of these sources 
still exist.  Though Fabius Pictor’s account is fairly biased against the Carthaginians, the 
accounts of both he and Cincius, who was actually held prisoner by Hannibal for a time, 
                                                            
3Eckstein, Arthur M. 2014. “Livy, Polybius, and the Greek East” In A Companion to Livy, edited by Bernard 
Mineo, p. 408‐9. Online 
4 Eckstein p. 408‐11 
5 Champion, Craige B. 2014. “Livy and the Greek Historians from Herodotus to Dionysius: Some Soundings 
and Reflections” In A Companion to Livy, edited by Bernard Mineo, p. 196‐7. Online 
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are invaluable sources contemporary to the war.6  The Roman sources would have 
furthered Livy’s ability to record the changes that underwent Roman politics during the 
course of the war.  Additionally, these sources would have likely used the Annales 
Maximi, a pontifical record of political events of every year, which some assert Livy did 
not use directly.7  Evidence for this rests in Livy’s consistent pattern of political officials 
every year.8  Despite his use of a number reliable and useful sources, Livy’s motives and 
personal background do present the challenges to using him as a source, however they do 
not disqualify his use especially for the concerned study.     
Though it is prevalent throughout his account, Livy specifically provides his 
motives for writing his massive account of Rome’s history from the city’s foundation in 
the preface.  He claims to write such a history to highlight moral figures and events 
telling his readers “that from thence you may select yourself and for your country that 
which you may imitate.”9  He believes Romans had seen major atrocities and all out 
moral decline in the recent decades that were destroying the empire from within.  These 
recent decades were so traumatic that Livy hopes his writing of more ancient times will 
offer a mental distraction from these troubles as well as an example to hopefully return to 
the moral principles he illustrates.  For Livy these moral principles are embodied in 
several historical individuals, and to a lesser extent groups or communities, and so he 
goes about retelling the history of these exemplary figures.  Unlike Polybius, Livy rarely 
interjects his narrative with personal comments or analysis of these moral figures, though 
he does sometimes communicate his personal views or that of his sources through the 
speeches of these individuals.10  Thus Livy’s motive results in a few concerns that must 
be kept in mind when using Livy for analysis.   
The first of these challenges is Livy’s characteristic Romano-centric perspective 
that led to large stereotypes of foreign figures and even entire peoples thus distorting his 
                                                            
6 Hoyos, Dexter. 2014. “Rome and Carthage in Livy” In A Companion to Livy, edited by Bernard Mineo, p. 
369‐70. Online 
7 Ogilvie p. 6 
8 Richardson, James H. 2014. “The Complications of Quellenforschung: The Case of Livy and Fabius Pictor” 
In A Companion to Livy, edited by Bernard Mineo, p. 13‐5. Online 
9 Livy 1.Preface 
10 Walsh p. 82‐5 
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overall accuracy of their portrayal.  Livy rarely takes the time to provide full studies of 
foreigners outside of Rome and the peoples are generally described as a whole with the 
turn of one phrase such as “Punic faith”11 or “Gallic ferocity”.12  This description can 
extend however as individuals of those nations such as Hannibal immediately carry with 
him the descriptions of Carthaginians as a whole.  Conversely, his actions also directly 
affect the outlook of the collective Carthaginian people.  Geography of a people’s 
environment also plays a major role in developing their moral standing such as the 
Samnites who Livy considered rough and possibly untrusting because of their 
mountainous surroundings.  These stereotypes do not just separate groups, but rather 
develop a moral hierarchy measuring how close people come to being Roman.  Immoral 
Romans can even be relegated to near barbaric status, while outsiders who master their 
passions can become nearly Roman.  This can be seen very clearly with the primary 
enemy of the Second Punic War, Hannibal because Livy’s descriptions and actions are 
often colored with his own broad stereotypes often depicting varying portraits of 
Hannibal.  Livy’s generalized descriptions were not limited to foreigners, however and 
his accounts of the Romans themselves can present a more positive light though he does 
completely abstain from criticizing Roman leaders or groups as a whole.13  This is 
primarily the result of Livy’s motives to present the Roman past as more virtuous and 
worthy of emulating.   
The overall consideration that must be kept in mind when using Livy is the 
potential effects of his motives on the portrayal of historic individuals, which is 
especially true with the most prominent historical figure of this study, Scipio Africanus.  
Scipio’s place in Livy’s description of the Second Punic War is very pronounced making 
him the very clear figure to exemplify the political changes as a result of the war.  
Scipio’s appearance in the war is actually quite early, though Livy is sure to point out his 
ultimate fate of ending the war at the same time.  When a cavalry engagement breaks out 
between troops led by Hannibal and Scipio’s father, the reigning consul, the elder Scipio 
is wounded, but is saved by the brave actions of his son.  Though Livy admits there are 
                                                            
11 Livy 22.6 
12 Livy 7.12 
13 Bernard, Jacques‐Emmanuel. 2014. “Portraits of Peoples” In A Companion to Livy, edited by Bernard 
Mineo, p. 39‐43. Online 
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accounts the consul was saved by a slave, he quickly dismisses them admitting the sole 
reason is his personal preference.14  Livy likely prefers this story versus the slave to 
further his moral agenda.  Later, Livy also makes an extended effort to highlight Scipio 
Africanus’s election to aedile despite his being below the necessary age requirement.  
Though this is of political consequence, which is discussed later, it is worthy of mention 
because Livy goes out of his way to interject the narrative with the special note of 
Scipio’s political election.15  Overall, these instances show that Livy excessively focuses 
on Scipio by mentioning his early military and political activities.   
Though Livy makes Scipio Africanus an exaggerated focus of his account, the 
exalted protroyal of Scipio Africanus at the Tomb of the Scipiones, despite refusing to be 
buried there, indicate Livy was not the first proponent of this exaggeration.  The Tomb of 
the Scipiones is located on the southeast side of Rome between the Via Appia and Via 
Latina.  It was built sometime during the early to mid-third century by either Scipio 
Barbatos, who served as consul against the Samnites, or one of his sons, who were both 
consuls during the First Punic War.  The tomb underwent a renovation in the mid second 
century to modernize and enlarge area.16  The tomb features a large fresco that now only 
has portions of the three layers remaining.  This fresco was topped by three statues 
including the writer Ennius, Scipio Asiaticus, and Scipio Africanus, who is shown in the 
prominent center position.  Visual evidence of the fresco indicates three confirmed layers, 
the outermost being a nature scene and the other two some unconfirmed figurative 
scenes.17  Visual evidence from the fresco shows two individual elephants on the lower 
layer that would have been created when the tomb was first renovated in the mid-second 
century.18  Though these are possibly from the war fought by Asiaticus, Scipio 
Africanus’s position at the center of the tomb’s fresco provide some evidence the scene 
further emphasized Scipio Africanus possibly by showing the battle of Zama or Scipio’s 
triumph in Rome. The evidence of the fresco cannot be confirmed, but Scipio Africanus’s 
                                                            
14 Livy 21.46 
15 Livy 25.2 
16 Holliday, Peter J. The Origins of Roman Historical Commemoration in the Visual Arts. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. P. 33‐4 
17 Holliday p. 34 
18 Figures 1, 1a, 2, and 2b in appendix 
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prominence on the exterior of the tomb is evident.  This is striking though because Scipio 
Africanus was never buried at the tomb and is actually not buried in Rome at all.  This 
was the result of a falling out late in Scipio’s life when he is accused of embezzlement in 
conjunction with the war against Antiouchus III.19  Thus Scipio Africanus was so exalted 
either by the remaining Scipio family or perhaps by a greater number of people from 
Rome, that he is the primary figure of a family tomb that was initially built before his rise 
to power and does not even house his remains.  This indicates that others held the same 
regard for Scipio as Livy’s amplified focus, but nearly a century before when the tomb 
was renovated.  This does characteristic does not deny that Livy may have exaggerated 
accounts of Scipio, but it does show he was not alone in Roman society in the high regard 
he held for Scipio and so a small fraction of this elevated position was based on Scipio’s 
position in Roman society.     
Though Livy’s motives indicate the need for some caution in citing events as 
reported by Livy, the balance of some of Livy’s descriptions indicate he did not see 
Scipio as flawless or a mythical figure.  Livy does indicate mythical instances such as the 
rumor that Scipio was born from a serpent much like Alexander the Great or had a direct 
connection with the gods.  Despite this, he generally qualifies and critiques these 
instances such as with the two previous examples, which Livy credits both to the personal 
design of Scipio.20  Additionally, Livy does not omit many of Scipio’s less virtuous 
actions such as his potentially dubious tactics in burning the camps of Syphax and 
Hasdrubal in Africa, though he is admittedly less critical than Scipio may deserve.21  
Livy’s possible distortions are sometimes undeniable however such as the meeting 
between Scipio and Hannibal serving as an improbable instance for even Hannibal 
himself to admit Scipio’s greatness.22  Livy’s critique does assure the reader that accounts 
of Scipio can be utilized, but with some caution.   
                                                            
19 Livy 38.52 
20 Walsh p. 94‐5 
21 Livy 30.5‐6 
22 Livy 35.14 
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In addition to his moral agenda, Livy asserts during his preface his goal is not to 
confirm or deny facts of ancient practices and traditions that have been passed down.23  
For this statement Livy is specifically referring to practices during the foundation of the 
city, but it conveys that he is not focusing on historical accuracy.  Though he states this, 
his choice of using the annalistic tradition of writing indicates he was not oblivious to the 
issue of historical accuracy.  Though none of the works have survived, the tradition of 
annalistic historiography goes back to the 3rd century to some of Livy’s sources namely 
Fabius Pictor and Cincius Ailementus.  Annalistic historiography referred to taking a 
systematic approach of progressing the narrative on a year by year basis.  Although 
another writing tradition of contemporary history had begun in the 2nd century and was 
utilized by Sallust and Julius Caesar, Livy still made the conscious decision to utilize the 
annalistic form.  Thus Livy’s choice to use an annalistic style indicates his focus was 
more on the past rather than the contemporary events around him.24  This conscious 
choice to focus on Rome’s history indicates a preference for the sources contemporary to 
events at the height of the Republic, such as the Second Punic War, rather than recent 
developments such as Augustus or the civil wars.  This is once again in line with the 
motives of his preface to distract from the calamities of his day in preference for 
historical accounts.  Additionally, if Livy did not directly use the massive record of 
Roman political history, the Annales Maximi, as some suggest,25 identifying with this 
tradition would have further enabled his use of previous sources of the tradition.  This 
would enable drawing on comparable political records to the Annales Maximi found in 
previous annalistic sources, who likely used the political record directly.  As a result, the 
presentation of historical figures such as Scipio Africanus would not have been solely 
Livy’s perspective, but instead a composite of previous writers including those 
contemporary to him.26  Although, Livy may not have explicitly realized it in his motives 
for writing, his conscious choice to return to an annalistic tradition stressed a greater 
                                                            
23 Livy 1.Preface 
24 Hahn, Frances Hickson. 2014. “Livy’s Liturgical Order: Systematization in the History” In A Companion to 
Livy, edited by Bernard Mineo, p. 92. Online 
25 Ungern‐Sternberg, Jürgen. 2014. “Livy and the Annalistic Tradition” In A Companion to Livy, edited by 
Bernard Mineo, p. 169. Online 
26 Levene, David S. 2014. “Allusions and Intertextuality in Livy’s Third Decade” In A Companion to Livy, 
edited by Bernard Mineo, p. 214‐5. Online 
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historical accuracy and allowed him to use a greater number of sources resulting in a 
more reliable account.    
Lastly, the timing of Livy’s writing allowed for the greatest amount of time to 
pass with which to analyze the precedents of the Second Punic War, but still early enough 
to fondly remember the Republic firsthand.  Although Polybius beginning his writing in 
approximately 168-167 BC allowed for a greater level of historical accuracy and more 
reliable use of sources, its close chronological proximity to the war meant that he could 
not fully analyze the effects of the events he recorded.  Polybius would even have to wait 
until during his writing to see the climax of Roman-Carthaginian relations in 146 BC 
when Rome finally destroyed Carthage.  Additionally, Polybius’s account would not 
analyze any of the dramatic occurrences of the first century BC which saw the dramatic 
fall of the Republic.  On the other hand, accounts that occurred after moved away at first 
from recalling the Republic in a positive light such as Seneca who does not lament the 
loss of the Republic and then ultimately to not considering the Republic at all.  This first 
occurs with Tacitus who records Rome’s history to teach lessons of the past, much like 
Livy, except now Rome’s past was distinctly imperial.27  Thus Livy wrote in the era that 
enabled him to see the maximum change that occurred during his account of history, but 
early enough to ensure his history was Republican history and not marred by his imperial 
present.   
Overall, as shown, Livy proves a useful source for an analysis of the Second 
Punic War and the precedents that are set during the course of the war that mark it a 
turning point.  He has distinct advantages such as his place in history or his working 
knowledge of Roman politics allowing him to claim these precedents.  These precedents 
have to be considered critically, however, and must be most cautiously approached if the 
narrating of the historical event advances or erodes the moral position of the figure, 
group, or generalized people in question.   
 
 
                                                            
27 Gowing p.153‐4 
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A Changing Roman Economy 
A major component of the Roman movement towards an empire that is elaborated 
on by Livy are the economic changes experienced by Rome’s aristocratic class, the 
commercial middle class, and the soldiers of Rome’s armies.  As a result of a law that 
was passed at the beginning of the Second Punic War limiting ships owned by senators 
and the geographic dispersion of the war which dictated transport by sea to be efficient, it 
was necessary that the senate reach out to Rome’s commercial middle class, the 
publicani.  The middle class profited immensely from this need, which ultimately led to a 
power struggle between the senate and publicani in the late Republic.  Additionally, the 
funding provided them with exemption to military service.  During the war, Rome was 
also forced to implement a new coinage system which resulted in two independent 
currencies used by the public and military respectively.  The combination of the divided 
currency systems and the exemption of military service showed the initial stages of a 
professional army from a societal perspective, in which citizen roles and soldier roles 
were now independent unlike the Republic’s citizen soldiers.   
 One economic development that would have fairly far reaching effects in the late 
Republic was the passing of Lex Claudia de nave senatoris at the very start of the Second 
Punic War.  Livy, who is our only source for the law, states the Lex Claudia de nave 
senatoris was a law that limited senators to owning just one ship for commercial 
activities.  Livy seems to imply that the motivation for the law was to limit the 
commercial activities of senators, who he believes should stay to nobler agrarian 
livelihoods, while providing them just enough to transport their personal goods.28  Some 
modern scholars dispute Livy’s description of the motivation as anachronistic and instead 
assert that it was to ensure that the senate, the primary decision makers of foreign policy 
and military logistics, could not profit from their decisions in order to preserve the 
senate’s decision making motivations.29  The law seems to be passed in part because of 
the newfound necessity of armies and diplomats alike for sea transport rather than land 
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marches because of the geographic distance of the Spanish and Greek theaters.30  This is 
compared to the First Punic War when one of the only instances of transport and supply 
via sea was Regullus’s invasion of Africa, which ultimately fails and an invasion of 
Africa is not attempted the rest of the war.31   
Though arguments have been made that this law further entrenched the 
aristocratic class in their agricultural ways leading to later land crises, this seems to be a 
fairly lengthy claim as land and agrarian practices are impacted by a number of other 
effects during the war.32  These effects are discussed later in this study with regards to 
their effect on the general-soldier relationship and Roman land control.  For example in 
this present discussion however, the prominent effects on Roman land owning was 
Hannibal’s raiding of Italy for 15 years.33  The resulting devastation resulted in the 
displacement of the former land owners or the death of the land owners themselves, 
which opened some of this land to purchase.  Thus this one small example of several 
during the war that could have had an impact on the future land crises.   
A more certain claim of the Lex Claudia de nave senatoris, however, is that it 
would have a dramatic impact on the commercial Roman middle class, the publicani.34  
Allowing the publicani nearly complete independence from the competition the 
aristocratic class enabled the middle class to make huge profits.  This is evident in book 
23, when Roman armies have been abroad in Spain for three years and after a successful 
battle against Hasdrubal the Roman armies are in need of supplies especially with three 
Carthaginian generals active in Spain.  All the while, there was the threat that Macedonia 
would enter the war and taxes had declined as a result of shrinking Roman manpower.  
With the state treasury depleted, it is resolved that the commercial publicani will supply 
the necessary provisions to Spain and will later be repaid.  Nineteen persons agree to the 
contract on the condition that their losses are insured by the state and more importantly 
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that they are exempt from military service.35  Though an instance of public funding 
bailing out the Roman state had occurred before in the First Punic War,36 this time it 
differs in that a long term contract is formed rather than just by voluntary donations by an 
individual or group for the sum of one ship.  The long term contract rather than the one 
time installment was the result of the necessity of the geographic distance of the Second 
Punic War as well as the huge financial strain.  This long term agreement enables the 
commercial middle class to achieve such wealth and indirect power that some of the 
publicani are found to profiting via fraud from the clause that dictated the state pay back 
any losses of ships.  The senate is unable to properly address the issue until later because 
of the state of affairs and the senate’s reliance on the publicani at this point in the war.37   
This economic boom of Rome’s middle class would later have dramatic effects.   
The economic profit the Lex Claudia de nave senatoris allowed the publicani 
would have a notable impact on crises that would develop during the late Republic.  After 
the Second Punic War, Roman expansion was less overtly fueled by the necessity of a 
direct attack like Hannibal.  Though the nature of Roman imperialism is heavily debated, 
it is clear that Rome suffered no direct assault on Italy to the point the city of Rome itself 
could have been threatened during the century following the Second Punic War.  As a 
result, the Roman state was often divided and thus unpredictable with regards to foreign 
policy because of the various interest groups.  On one side, was at least a portion of the 
senate that often appeared reluctant to add greater responsibility and thus territory to the 
Roman Empire and so often hesitated with regards to expansion.  This was contrasted 
with the publicani who promoted expansion to expand potential markets to further their 
commercial activities and receive public contracts like the one given during the Second 
Punic War.  These interest groups were often in direct conflict leading to unpredictable 
Roman involvement, or lack thereof, in foreign affairs.38  This conflict would come to 
head with the political actions of the populares who were in the camp that wished to 
expand and institutionalize Roman hegemony and were now of the financial and popular 
power level to seek radical change to a number of issues facing the Republic.  This 
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ultimately led to unprecedented violence in Rome beginning with the murder of political 
officials in the streets by mobs and escalating to Sulla marching his legions on Rome 
itself.39  Thus the internal strife of the late Republic was due in part to the publicani’s 
profit from the long term contract that was necessary because of the dire condition of the 
state’s finances during the Second Punic War.  This along with the geographic distance 
influenced Rome’s commercial class seeking further and further territorial expansion and 
thus economic opportunities.  This would ultimately drive the Roman Empire into a state 
of open conflict unlike any it had seen before.   
In addition to the far reaching financial class changes, there were also dramatic 
changes to Roman currency during the Second Punic War.  In book 26, the Roman state 
once again runs into similar issues as previously described when it is in need of rowers as 
part of a levy of troops.  Initially, an edict is issued which requires private individuals to 
provide rowers in proportion of their income, but this time it is openly refused.  Roman 
citizens appear exhausted of war and just before this event is described, Livy mentions 
how the people of Rome complained of the levies, the length of the war, and the 
devastation that occurred throughout Italy.  They publically vent frustrations of how their 
armies have been cut down continuously and their slaves have already been purchased at 
very low rates for armies and now they are demanded once again.  The necessity of 
rowers is dire though and the solution for the senate and magistrates is to volunteer a 
seemingly very large portion of their personal funds as an example.  The solution works 
and the equestrians emulate the senate who are in turn emulated by the commons.40  
Though this event provides a much needed stimulus to the state treasury and fills the levy 
requirement, it has more radical effects as the collection of nearly the entire cities 
currency and precious metal allows for a new financial system to immerge.   
The economic strain of the Second Punic War brought about by supporting 
military forces of unprecedented size and the devastation of Roman land holdings 
ultimately brought about the utter collapse of the current currency structure requiring a 
new system to be implemented.  The Roman financial system had long been based on 
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bronze coinage, while silver coinage had been implemented only as recently as 269 BC 
just before the First Punic War.41  Both coinage systems would ultimately collapse within 
ten years of the start of the Second Punic War as they were continually debased to the 
point that the bronze as and silver drachma were 25% and 30% respectively of their 
original precious metal compositions.  As a result, an entirely new system was installed in 
211 BC, which created two seemingly independent currencies based on the silver denarii 
for use in the public sector, primarily Rome, and the other using the victoriati for nearly 
exclusive use within the Roman military.42  The victoriati was use as the legacy to the 
previous drachma by using the same weight and distributing it in the same area the 
drachma had been most used, southern Italy, northern Italy, and southern Gaul where the 
drachma had been used.  This is the apparent reason for its extensive use by the military.  
The strength of the new system was derived from the fact that the victoriati and denarii 
were not fractions of one another during the Republic, though an imperial coin that 
reused the name of the victoriatti was later incorporated into the system of the denarii.43  
Additionally, the victoriatti contained some base metals further separating it from the 
pure silver denarii.44  This change was enabled as a result of Roman victories at 
Syracuse, Capua, Carthago Nova, and Tarentum, which brought continuous booty to 
Rome from 212 to 206 BC.45  Scipio’s victory in Spain is especially important because it 
gave the Romans access to the many mines in the area, especially for silver, in order to 
sustain this financial shift.46  The denarii was ultimately used for nearly five centuries 
until it was replaced by the antoninianus in the mid-third century AD.  The victoriatti 
lapsed in 170 BC, though it nominally made a brief return though it was not the same 
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coin.47  Additionally, the bronze coinage was also lightened though it maintained the 
name as, which in practice simply reorganized bronzed coinage from its debased value.48    
The creation of two independent currency systems, one for the public and one for 
the military, along with the granting of exemption from military service in return for 
private finances began to divide the societal relation between the roles of a citizen and of 
a soldier in the Republic’s citizen army.  Those two roles were no longer interlinked as 
simultaneous duties of the state.  Like the new currency system, the supply contract made 
between the state and publicani reflects the beginning of a shift towards a professional 
army rather than citizens serving.  As mentioned, part of the contract dictated that those 
that were paying to supply the forces in Spain would be exempt from military service.49  
Although partially the result of a major crisis, the event shows that Romans were ready 
and willing to trade their personal revenues in exchange for remaining out of service to 
maintain their personal holdings.  Even more so, it sets the precedent of a portion of the 
populace being allowed the exemption.  Additionally, the precedent of citizens exempt 
from service occurred during one of the more critical times of what was perhaps the 
Romans most contested war creates the initial gap.  This precedent which would shield 
citizens from military service, coupled with the shift to a new currency system which 
developed two sets of independent coinages between the military and civilians, began to 
separate the role of being a citizen and the role of being a soldier, which at the onset of 
the war were unified.   
These changes show the beginnings of the formation of a professional army that is 
very separate for normal civilian society.  In this it is comparable to soldiers in the armies 
of the first century, namely Caesar’s.  One historian states Caesar’s soldiers began to 
have “a feeling of belonging to a distinct society with its own rules and codes…”  and 
continues saying “they found in their comrades in the contubernium, the century, the 
cohort, and the legion, a new world, a new way of life, the life of professional soldiers.”50   
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Though this societal divide was due in part to the shifting loyalties of armies and their 
long terms abroad, which will be described momentarily, the separation of currency 
between citizen and soldier strikingly reflects the later complete separation of those 
societies.  This expanding divide could also be embodied by the actions of Caesar who 
continuously needs to travel south each winter during his Gallic campaign just to be a 
part of Rome’s political developments.  Thus even one of Rome’s most powerful 
generals, who had several administrative powers to delegate such work, had to return 
close to Italy just to stay connected to the political life of Rome, which he was so 
disconnected from on the frontier.  This is despite the fact his army would have to remain 
in Gaul and he continually would return to revolts over multiple years.  Additionally, 
Caesar would often emphasis this separation to his soldiers when he emphasized their 
superiority.51  This dividing gap between military and civilian forces is traceable to the 
social significance of the disconnection of the two currencies.  This divide continued to 
separate in practice as the Roman army became increasingly professional, though still 
nominally a citizen army, until Augustus made the definitive change.52  Thus the Second 
Punic War shows the turning point of the Roman economy in its transformation towards 
empire through further empowering a wealthy commercial class, implementing a 
currency system that would be used for nearly five centuries, and allowing citizens 
military exemption in return for financing which had dramatic impacts on internal Roman 
politics and the military dynamic.   
Military and Recruiting: A Trial of the Military Future 
The rigors of the Second Punic War brought about significant changes to the 
Roman army that, though not in a continuous development, would be appear again in the 
late Republic with dramatic consequences.  As the war progressed, Roman armies spent 
more and more time abroad in foreign territory without the possibility of return to Italy.  
This along with the Roman army’s failures in battle and the geographic distance of the 
fighting put large strains on the sources of manpower and the current recruitment 
methods.  As a result, recruiting criteria and methods shifted to be more tolerant of the 
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individuals recruiting and more decentralized in terms of location.  Lastly, the 
relationship between the generals and the armies in the Second Punic War showed very 
considerable differences with respect to previous wars and instead reflected the start of a 
growing trend of the same relationship between the armies and generals of the late 
Republic. 
 Roman forces were active abroad during the Second Punic War from the very 
start as after Publius Scipio, father of the later Scipio Africanus and the reigning consul 
of the time, is eluded at the Rhone River by Hannibal, who is making his way to Italy. 
Publius Scipio then sends his army onto Spain under command of his brother, Cneius 
Scipio.  This army was ultimately active under Cenius for seven years.  A year later, 
Publius Scipio brought another army to Spain which would serve for six years.53  Both 
generals and armies would ultimately be defeated and killed in battle within the span of a 
few days of each other in part because the Celtiberian mercenaries being used by the 
Romans were bribed into neutrality by the Carthaginians.  These defeats left the armies 
depleted and demoralized as they gathered and elected a temporary leader, Lucius 
Marcius.54  Despite Marcius winning a victory to survive in Spain, a new general is 
elected in Rome.  This general, who is given the powers of proconsul, is Publius Scipio, 
son of the late Publius Scipio.  Livy comments that Marcius was superseded because the 
senate was not yet ready for a general elected by his own army, which seems plausible 
considering the excessive control the senate utilizes during the war.  Though Scipio’s 
leadership has more dramatic effects on recruiting, as mentioned later, for this context it 
is important because he brings some new forces with him, but also incorporates the 
remnants of the army of his father and uncle into his own force.55  This sustains those 
Spanish veterans who serve the remaining seven years of Scipio’s campaign.56  
Ultimately, those veterans who survived the war in Spain could have served up to 14 
years with no recorded evidence of personal relief in a return to Italy.   
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This element of the Second Punic War had a marked difference from past 
campaigns which were either just a shorter duration and so troops were not abroad as 
long or the troops were active in regions much closer to Italy and Rome with fighting less 
dire enabling troops to return home.  The most obvious evidence is during the First Punic 
War looking at the number of triumphs alone, which would have dictated that the 
victorious army or fleet would return with the general to celebrate.  Several examples 
include the armies of Valerius Maximus57 and Atilius Caiatinus in Sicily and fleets of 
Gaius Duilius,58 Lucius Scipio, Sulpicius Paterculus, Atilius Regulus,59 Manlius Vulso,60 
and Sempronius Blaesus61 who all celebrated triumphs within a ten year period of the 
war, though there were even more during that same period that are not listed.  The 
Second Punic War paled in comparison with fair less triumphs in number and the first 
triumph not occurring until 207 BC.62  Armies and fleets also returned out of necessity, 
such as Lucius Scipio’s returning from Sardinia because he was outnumbered63 or 
Regulus’s army being evacuated from Africa after his defeat.   
Evidence suggests that it was often of personal importance of many, both general 
and soldier, to return home.  Regulus is said to have wanted to give up his command in 
Africa during the First Punic War because of his concern for his wife and children 
maintaining his farm.64  During the Second Punic War both Marcellus who fought 
throughout Italy and Sicily and Scipio in Spain are said to have hoped to bring their 
troops home in triumph.  Though possibly for self-promotion, Marcellus is said to have 
argued for triumph from the senate more on account of his soldiers return than his own 
personal fame.65  Though it is likely to be Livy’s promotion, Scipio echoes similar 
sentiments in wanting to bring his soldiers home on account of their countless years of 
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continual service and loyalty to his family.66  Marcellus’s actions would be more reliable 
as it is likely some senate account would have been kept especially because Marcellus is 
ultimately not granted a triumph, but rather an ovation so his soldiers can still enter the 
city.  This importance for soldiers to return home can also be seen in that forced time 
abroad was used as punishment for failures in battle, such as the survivors of Cannae, 
who were ordered to remain in Sicily with a limit on garrisoning in towns for the 
remainder of the war with no return.67  For Scipio and his men though it was instead the 
result of geographic necessity that they remained abroad so long.   
As these armies stayed abroad longer it forced the Roman senate to adapt 
recruiting methods that differed greatly from the normal parameters and structures and to 
recruit at unprecedented levels.  Roman forces abroad meant that it was much more 
difficult to keep an army maintained by reinforcements from Rome and Italy alone.  One 
of the Roman recruitment solutions was to hire mercenaries, specifically the Celtiberians, 
for the first time at the Roman camp in Spain.68  As mentioned before, this proves 
disastrous for Cneius Scipio who incorporated them into his forces only to have them 
bought off by the Carthaginians and leave him with a force incapable of matching his 
opposing Carthaginian force.  Livy is sure to promote his own moral agenda stating 
foreign auxiliaries are never to be trusted.69  This solution is abandoned and a Roman 
force never relies on mercenaries during the rest of the war.   
The other alternative which is explored is expanding the recruitment in Roman 
society.  This expansion is most startling with the use of slaves in armed forces in Italy 
under the command of Tiberius Gracchus.  Though this was not necessarily a common 
practice throughout the war, this army is cited on multiple occasions because the majority 
of its composition is slaves who are promised freedom for their service.70  They achieve 
this freedom in battle, but are ultimately destroyed by Hannibal at Lucania in southern 
Italy.  The surviving freed slaves abandon the cause after the death of Gracchus during 
that battle until Scipio Africanus recruits them back to make a combined effort with the 
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consul Appius Claudius to besiege Capua.71  Though the slave army met initial success, 
when nothing concrete was maintaining loyalty of the slaves, they abandon this cause.  
The use of slaves for armed forces was a recruiting change that was not adopted after the 
war, but it does show just how dire the need for manpower and the lengths the Romans 
were willing to go to field armies.   
Recruiting also underwent a fundamental change during the war of where and 
how, rather than just who, to levy as soldiers, which ultimately provided generals with 
more power and independence in managing their forces.  This primarily consisted of the 
Roman forces being recruited from more local groups.  Multiple times through Livy’s 
description consuls are given the liberty to enlist as many troops as is necessary to fill 
their numbers.  At the early stages of the war this is limited to allies as the consuls are 
given the power to levy as many allies as seen fit in books 21 and 22, rather than a given 
number provided by the state.72  This freedom is later expanded during Livy’s normal 
political official turnovers in books 26 and twice in book 27.  The new officers are 
commanded that when they are want of troops they are to recruit them from the existing 
legions present in the provincia they are assigned.73  The standard recruiting procedure 
according to one specific description states the consuls arranged a day for all men of 
military age to meet publically.  Then the consuls or public assembly choose from these 
men, who approach in small groups of four, going tribe by tribe, to form four large 
groups which ultimately become the four legions.  Lastly, officials are deployed to the 
allies demanding a set number of troops on the assigned date at the assigned place.  This 
description is quite difficult to use however as at one point during the Second Punic War, 
25 legions were operating at one time.  Creating four legions by choosing from four-man 
groups at a time would have been exhausting and impossible for a count as high as 25 
legions.  Additionally, these forces remained in the field year to year and so using these 
procedures yearly was not necessary.74  Though this does not signify a marked change in 
the criteria of men to be recruited it is a noticeable change in that the armies are not 
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organized and deployed from Rome, but rather the officers recruit their armies first with 
the independent power over allies and later over the legions themselves.  
The recruitment freedom previously provided sees a variation in book 28’s 
description, which specifically focuses on Scipio’s preparations for operations in Africa 
while serving as consul in Sicily.  The passage specifies that he is not given the power to 
levy, though he heavily implored the senate to do so, he is able to accept volunteers who 
should wish to serve.  This is a growth from the previous three descriptions which make 
mention of using remaining legions.  Though it was not through the lawful structure of a 
levy, the senate still granted Scipio powers that enable him to build his forces.  It is a shift 
from the previous instances because he is drawing from the unorganized groups of the 
public and forming an army by his command.75  This growing independence of general’s 
recruiting stemmed from the massive amount of forces Rome was already fielding and 
from the geographic dispersion of troops.  In the year 212 BC, Rome fielded up to 25 
legions in the field, which was an estimated 30% of Rome’s adult male citizen 
population.  Percent estimates of the allies’ population are much more difficult to find, 
though it is safe to assume it is also significant as allies provided approximately 60% of 
the manpower in the Second Punic War76  The already large percent involvement of the 
population meant the Roman state was not capable of forming any new legions and so the 
existing forces that remained in the field would have to be utilized.  The exact 
administering of this was left up to general then.  Similarly, Roman forces were spread so 
far and wide that new forces would sometimes move to different areas of need and so 
recruiting could be arranged there. 
This shift in recruiting practices during the Second Punic War ultimately serve as  
precedents for later in the more permanent changes in the actions of Gaius Marius.  
During Marius’s first consulship, he received the command in Numidia against Jagurtha 
immediately bringing about a sweeping change to the recruiting of the army.  To fulfill 
his need for soldiers, Marius goes about enrolling poor men who do not meet the Roman 
property requirement to serve.  Marius’s changes allowed for swift recruitment to meet 
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the pressing war needs first in Africa and later during his subsequent consulships in 
northern Italy and southern Gaul.77  This change is an expansion of the precedents set 
during the Second Punic War when generals were given the independence to make 
recruiting decisions and the laws and customs of recruiting were so relaxed that 
mercenaries, local volunteers, and even slaves were used.   
During the Second Punic War, the property requirement was also dropped briefly 
from 217 BC to 212 BC or 211 BC from the normal 11,000 asses for the fifth class with 
regards to Roman recruitment.  According to Livy this is the first time of such an 
occurrence since Servius Tullius, Rome’s sixth king, established the classes.78  This event 
is significant because according to Livy, it is the first property requirement reduction 
since the kings.  It is even more significant, however, in that the new standard doesn’t 
become permanent, but rather the old value is reinstated once Roman manpower 
stabilizes.  This would indicate a precedent for Marius’s actions down the road of lower 
the requirement to the point that it is eliminated, but the return to previous levels serve as 
evidence that Livy is not attempting to justify Marius.  This is because the precedent of 
the third century is resolved as soon as the crisis is passed, unlike Marius’s changes.  If 
Livy was attempting to justify Marius, the moral examples of Livy’s Republican history 
would have maintained such a lowered recruiting standard.  Marius’s changes would later 
have dramatic impacts in that it shifted the loyalty of soldiers from the state to that of 
their personal generals.  This was because the poor and landless soldiers now depended 
on their general to provide land upon their discharge.  This dynamic concretely 
materialized with Sulla’s march on Rome.79  A change in the general-soldier relationship 
was not unique to Marius and his successors, but once again this feature can be traced 
back to the Second Punic War.   
The soldier-general relationship shift, in which the long terms abroad and the land 
devastation in Italy unique to the Second Punic War showed a glimpse into future Roman 
politics, are best embodied in the experiences of Scipio Africanus.  Though he is a critical 
example for political changes as discussed later, he is just as essential for the study of 
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military changes during the war.  Spending so much time abroad coupled with the 
growing flexibility and responsibility given to generals as touched on beforehand, an 
army’s general would become the greatest figure of authority among the army and the 
long term abroad would develop a connection of self-reliance, which in the dangerous 
situation of the Second Punic War could mean survival.80  Livy indicates this relationship 
in the first speech of Publius Scipio, later Africanus, to his troops upon his arrival in 
Spain.  Livy’s speech for Scipio continually relates both the army’s respect and esteem 
for their late commanders as well as the uniqueness of this level of admiration for them 
and their family to the point that without even knowing their new commander they 
support his as he is of the Scipio line. 81  Though the specific content of the speech is 
unreliable, Livy indicates that the loyalty of soldiers towards the general was already a 
concern in the late third century.   
This is even more evident later in Scipio’s term in Spain, when he falls ill and as 
rumors are exaggerated that the illness is likely fatal, unrest occurs in Spain and Gaul.  
Livy especially highlights the Roman garrison at Sucro that mutinies.  After the mutiny is 
crushed by killing the members who start it, the remaining troops take an oath of 
allegiance to Scipio though no mention is made of an oath to Rome.  Livy claims that the 
mutiny demonstrates how much of the sustained success in Spain can be credited to 
Scipio.82  Though that is likely true the oath is a further indication that he was the primary 
authority to his men and the surrounding people in Spain as it is only specifically 
mentioned that the reclaimed troops swore to him rather than Rome.  This reveals the 
significance of the power and authority that Scipio had achieved in Spain.   
The Second Punic War is an especially unique comparison to the first century BC 
because they both offer examples of a large demand by soldiers for land after the fighting 
was over.  The first century’s soldiers sought land because the innovations of Marius 
which resulted in the landless recruits that were previously discussed.  The Second Punic 
War soldiers were landless in a similar sense because Italy had suffered from land loss 
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and devastation in Italy unlike any before.83  This is a unique characteristic from the wars 
to come before and those immediately after.  Hannibal’s nearly 15 year campaign in Italy 
with intentions, especially early in the war, of destroying Roman agriculture and 
infrastructure left the returning veterans with little of their former farms.84  This is even 
more evident by Scipio’s post-war political efforts to attempt to ensure his returning 
veterans were given land by forming a ten-man commission while he is in the influential 
role of censor.85  Scipio differs from his first century successors though by being sure to 
stress that land must given through the state rather than any personal action of his own.  
Though his methods differ and do not yet show the overt ambition of the late Republic’s 
leaders, the unique post-war situation shows the same problems of landless veterans 
returning from war and how distribution of land was the proposed solution.   
The issues of long variable service times without return home, difficulties 
recruiting within the normal Roman laws and customs, and the growing dependence of 
soldiers on their generals would persist with many temporary solutions like Marius until 
they were permanently resolved by the man who would use them to secure his long-term 
power, Augustus.  After his victory at Actium, Augustus controlled 60 legions and a huge 
navy which needed to be safely disbanded while maintaining his newfound control.  He 
first established a minimum service requirement and a fixed reward for those that served 
this length.  This removed the variability of the term length and the variance of rewards 
that so affected a soldier’s loyalty to the state.  At first this reward was land in the 
tradition of the Republic, but as Augustus’s reign grew more stable it slowly shifted over 
to a monetary reward.  Additionally, he permanently stationed troops as garrisons on the 
frontier.  These changes allowed the army to continue to draw from all social classes, 
including the poor and landless, providing a large manpower pool while trying to 
minimize the danger of an army following a single ambitious general over the state.  The 
use of landless troops also enabled this garrison approach as troops were not held to any 
location by any major personal holdings until after their service. 86   Thus it was not until 
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Augustus that the tensions on the army and recruiting were relieved that made their first 
appearance as a result of the extended rigors of the Second Punic War.  
Scipio Africanus: a New Breed of Politician 
 The late Roman Republic would be dominated by a series of powerful men who 
gained immense political, economic, and military power who further expanded the 
Roman Empire and ultimately brought the Republic crashing down under the weight of 
their ambitions.  The first great general of this era was Marius who achieved six 
successive consulships and made the critical changes to the army’s recruitment 
requirements as previously discussed.87  It was then Sulla who utilized this change as he 
marched his army on Rome against Marius himself because his soldiers now were more 
loyal to him then the state.88  The next generation with men like Pompey, Crassus, and 
Caesar would utilize the self-sustaining cycle of military achievement and political 
opportunities to dominate the Roman world until the balance was broken by the death of 
Crassus.  Pompey and Caesar then wielded the juggernauts they had forged against each 
other with Caesar rising victorious.89  This was short lived, however as after his 
assassination, a new civil war broke out between Caesar’s would-be successors, primarily 
Marc Antony and Octavian.  Through his victory, Octavian would become Rome’s new 
political power, but unlike his predecessors, he was able to skillfully institutionalize his 
power as he became Augustus.90  This is the generally accepted trend towards the 
establishment of the emperors, but this trend has origins much farther back than the 
traditional beginning with Marius.   
 Just as the Second Punic War showed changes in military and recruitment 
structures that would later be adopted more permanently, it also showed a glimpse of the 
future of Roman politics in the embodiment of Scipio Africanus.  As previously 
discussed, Scipio is one of Livy’s primary figures throughout the war and primarily only 
rivaled in focus by Hannibal.  Livy’s close attention to Scipio does confer benefits in that 
the greater the number of descriptions and actions described enable him to be more fully 
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analyzed.  This analysis demonstrates the precedents of Scipio in Roman politics both in 
his imperium abroad and at Rome.   First, he is given long term commands which initially 
are out of geographical necessity in Spain, but later out of his able command experience.  
With this, he is also given unprecedented diplomatic independence in his proceedings in 
Spain and then Africa.  Finally, his sustained success abroad propels him to exceed 
political limitations in place.  These characteristics were unparalleled at the time to solely 
Scipio and the Second Punic War, but can be found in the actions of the later great 
generals.  Thus the origins of the emperors and tumultuous first century BC can be traced 
back to Scipio Africanus.   
Scipio’s extended focus in Livy allows for analysis that indicates Scipio is the 
first of the type of political and military figures who achieve distinguished military 
success in a specific region, which ultimately enables a longer term command.  After the 
defeat and death of both his father and uncle in Spain, Scipio volunteers to take over their 
former commands of the surviving forces which are slightly supplemented by new troops.  
After his initial success in Spain taking Carthago Nova, his term commanding in Spain is 
extended from yearly to until he would be chosen to be recalled.91  The same would occur 
in the final years of the war as Scipio is granted an indefinite term until the war in Africa 
was brought to a conclusion in addition to even greater powers of independence.92  
Though the long term military effects of this decision were discussed earlier, this has 
profound political implications.   Despite Scipio’s short term of about a year relative to 
the overall nine year Roman involvement in Spain at that time, his swift military success 
leads to an indefinite appointment within Spain despite being just 24.   
In order to guard against the possible effects the motives of Livy could have had 
on this portrayal of Scipio Africanus, his uncle and father’s commands must be 
compared.  It is not made as clear whether or not the two Scipio generals in Spain before 
Scipio Africanus were given these indefinite commands.  It is likely though, based on 
their continued involvement and communicating with Rome as indicated by letters 
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requesting supplies,93 that Scipio Africanus’s father and uncle had similar term lengths.  
They achieved similar victories over the course of their campaign in Spain.  Additionally, 
no mention is ever made that the provincia of Spain was ever an option for the new 
consuls and no debate in the senate is ever mentioned sending a new general.  Thus it 
seems a logical conclusion that the elder Scipio brothers had secure commands in Spain 
like Scipio Africanus.  Livy’s motives admittedly led him to focus on Scipio Africanus’s 
indefinite appointment, but the events involving his father and uncle indicate that the 
precedent of long term commands for generals was a realistic precedent, but a unique one 
to the Second Punic War.  It was Scipio Africanus who could capitalize on it however, in 
that his campaign in Spain ends with nearly total victory over Carthaginian forces and an 
eventual appointment to the command in Africa rather than death and defeat like his 
father and uncle.   
 The Second Punic War’s situation resulted in this newfound military 
independence, unlike previous commanders, even if they achieved comparable military 
successes.  The war theater locations of the previous Punic War, Pyrrhic War, and the 
Samnite Wars meant that military commanders, Consuls specifically, often followed 
strictly to their political term schedules.  This is evident with Regullus and Lutatius who 
both have concerns of missing opportunities for glory to their potential successor 
Consuls.  This is in spite of Regullus and Lutatius already achieving victories in Africa 
and Sicily, respectively.94  This yearly changeover of command prevents any single man 
from achieving battle driven fame to even come close to rivaling that of Scipio.  The 
locations of these campaigns in Sicily and North Africa are in close enough proximity to 
Rome that the normal political structure can be continued.  Additionally, the lack of 
direct strain on Italy allowed for easier transportation and communication.  This changes, 
however, as Rome’s resources nearer to home are much more strained and the geographic 
distance to Spain, which by most armies up to that point arrived via land.  This enables 
Scipio Africanus the extended command in Spain in which he is wildly successful 
building a large amount of public popularity and political support.  It is this support that 
enables him to gain the command of entering Africa and its indefinite term, unlike 
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Regulus who invaded Africa before him and the two successive Consuls assigned Africa 
during Scipio’s campaign that are given lesser powers.95   
The growing stakes of the issue of the right to command, which Scipio first 
displayed, ultimately became such a seriously contested issue that it would lead to the 
first, but not the last, march on Rome.  Though it was not Marius’s march, he reinforces 
the power achievable through sustained command after Scipio.  Marius is first elected 
Consul for the war against Jagurtha in Africa and ultimately holds six successive 
Consulships serving in both Africa and northern Italy.  This streak of commands enables 
him to reform the recruiting methods of the army to eliminate the property requirement as 
discussed previously.  It is this long term command that enables such sweeping and 
successful changes.96  As also previously described, it is this change that results in the 
shifting of soldiers’ primary loyalty from the state to the general.97  It is Sulla who 
exploits this fact to march his army on Rome against Marius to install himself as dictator.  
The reason for this though is over a conflict for the command against Mithradates that 
was initially given to Sulla, but then is politically slipped to Marius.  Sulla’s march 
originated in a reaction to retrieve his command that was seemingly necessary from his 
perspective in order for his political survival rather than a premeditated action out of 
quests for pure power or personal rivalry.  The stakes of these commands were so great 
that, for Sulla’s case, it was worth being the first man to bring his army forcibly into 
Rome.98  Julius Caesar would later depend on the success of his own campaign and 
political campaigning to ensure a five year extension of his own campaign, which he 
would use to fund his own political ambitions of public building and political ambition.99  
Though these longer campaigns became increasingly common, it was Scipio who first 
broke the political mold of foreign command as a result of his previous long term military 
success that was enabled out of necessity.   
With his long term commands, came an advance in overall independence of 
command, but especially the growth in Scipio’s diplomatic freedom during the course of 
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the Second Punic War.  In the waning years of his involvements in Spain and with his 
conclusion of the war in Africa he is given, or takes, a large degree of independence to 
make diplomatic agreements on behalf of the state.  This would have far reaching effects 
on the actions of Pompey who received an increasingly autonomous campaign to reap 
huge economic and political gains by utilizing similar independent powers as well as 
vastly affect the future territory of the empire. 
 After Scipio’s nearly complete victory in Spain he sends gifts to King Syphax of 
Numidia in an attempt to procure an alliance that would allow him to easily pass over 
into Africa.  The gifts are warmly received, but Syphax says that he will not commit 
unless Scipio himself presents himself.  Thus he travels into Africa with only two ships 
and meets with both Syphax and Hasdrubal, the general he recently faced in Spain, who 
is also meeting with the king.  Overall, the conversations of the event are primarily to 
further elevate the virtues and manners of Scipio, but the journey does offer an interesting 
omission: no mention is made of Rome or the senate in conjunction with this journey.  
Scipio does not concern himself with his imperium being limited to the provincia of 
Spain and any necessity to send word to Rome.  Additionally, there is no mention that 
Rome ever questioned him on the matter.  The only motivator that Livy cites is his 
ambition to subdue Africa.100  This contains shades of Livy’s own hindsight on Scipio’s 
future actions, however.  Though this is not necessarily of major consequence, Scipio’s 
easy ability to pass into Africa meeting a foreign king who has previous Carthaginian 
involvements, including meeting with one of their major generals at the very same time 
as himself, is worthy of mention, especially in foreshadowing his future diplomatic 
powers.  Ultimately, Scipio’s trip is initially successful and he secures an alliance and 
good standing with Syphax, but later Syphax’s marriage to the daughter of the same 
Hasdrubal secures his loyalties back to Carthage.101   
 It is very difficult to analyze how much of a single precedent an instance like this 
was from preceding events as Rome had very little alliance relations outside of Italy with 
perhaps the exception of Massilia during a comparable war time when one general is 
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given freedom to make relations extending beyond his area of command.102  The closest 
possible example before the Second Punic War would be that of Hiero and Syracuse 
during the Frist Punic War.  At the onset of the First Punic War, Carthage and an old 
enemy of theirs, Syracuse, are in a tentative alliance to force out a group of mercenaries 
called the Mamertines who had taken over Messana in northeast Sicily.  Carthage and 
Syracuse ultimately conflict with Rome supporting the Mamertines and the Frist Punic 
War boils over from what first appeared just a minor skirmish.103  It is under these 
circumstances that comparison would lie when Rome is able to turn the loyalties of Hiero 
and Syracuse and sue for peace.  The closest thing to a Scipio-like figure in this peace 
agreement would be Valerius Maximus who would later triumph and stress his own 
involvement in the victory with a painting in the Curia Hostilia.  The situation of 
Valerius differs however in that both Consuls along with their armies operate in Sicily 
and it is unclear if Valerius is even the one to make the peace agreement.  Additionally, 
clear mention is made that the Roman state ratifyied this treaty unlike that of Scipio.104  
Finally, this treaty is much more a peace treaty then securing an alliance as Syracuse is 
forced to pay indemnities and did not play a major role the rest of the First Punic War.   
Any other comparisons of an individual securing friendly relations by an 
independent effort during war time are very difficult to find especially any that occur at a 
comparable distance from Rome to that of Scipio’s.  This is evident during Marcus 
Valerius Laevinus’s diplomatic envoy to the Aetolians attempting to secure an alliance 
for aid against Philip and Macedon, which occurs before the travel of Scipio to Syphax.  
Laevinus implores the Aetolians to join because of how well the Romans treat allies, but 
stresses that the “Aetolians would be honored by them (the Romans) so much the more, 
because they were the first of the nations across the sea which had entered into friendship 
with them.”105  According to Livy, who would have had a fairly accurate view of Rome’s 
diplomatic history cites this instance as the first foreign nation to ally with Rome and it is 
under circumstances of a much more state organized envoy than that of Scipio’s 
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journey.106  The other possible comparison would be Scipio Africanus’s own father and 
uncle who while in command in Spain send official diplomatic ambassadors rather than 
attend anything themselves.107   
During the Second Punic War, Scipio’s diplomatic powers would extend from one 
meeting without notice of the senate to being vested with the powers to end the entire war 
on account of the Roman people.  After the battle of Zama, Scipio emerges as the clear 
victor in Africa and Carthage is brought to its knees with no option, but to sue for peace.  
Rather than sending the envoy to Rome itself, the peace terms are dictated by Scipio 
himself by the senate’s command.  Even when the reigning Consuls are given the 
province of Africa, specifically Tiberius Claudius Nero and Cnaeus Cornelius Lentulus, 
the senate is sure to clearly define that Scipio is given sole command over the peace 
talks.108  Though it seems possible one could argue this is the result of the geographic 
difference, it seems unlikely that Scipio’s public standing and military track record would 
have no correlation with this power.  So it is solely Scipio who is given the ability to 
dictate terms to bring the war to a final close. 
This is in stark contrast to the most obvious comparison, the end of the First Punic 
War.  As that war draws to a close, it is clear to Carthage that there is no means by which 
to raise a fleet and the last few Carthaginian strongholds in Sicily surrender.  As a result 
the Carthaginian general Hamilicar, who is located in Sicily, is given the power to dictate 
terms of peace.  The initial peace agreement talks are with the Roman Consul located in 
Sicily, Lutatius.  The deal they make is voted on by the people and firmly rejected by the 
Roman people.  Then a ten person commission is sent to supersede Lutatius and dictate 
the final terms of peace.  Though Lutatius may have simply been too lenient and so the 
people of Rome rejected his terms, he was fortunate to be part of the talks anyways as it 
was the Carthaginian Hamilicar who initiate peace talks rather than Lutatius.  
Furthermore, after the initial treaty is rejected, he is completely replaced by a ten man 
commission which includes his own brother.109  Scipio was once again unique in the fact 
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that he set the precedent of individuals governing Roman foreign and diplomatic policy 
abroad.  He would not be the last however; as the effects would be felt years after his 
conclusion to the Second Punic War as they would have a dramatic impact on the 
organization of the eastern portion of the Roman Empire.   
The most profound beneficiary of Scipio’s precedent would be Pompey who 
would be granted unheard of administrative and military power in order to deal with 
pirates that threatened the Mediterranean.  He is given imperium over entire 
Mediterranean and the coastlines up to 50 miles inland.  He was also given fifteen 
subordinate commanders from the senate for administrative tasks as well as the power to 
levy any number of troops and sailors he saw fit.  Though this power is much more 
immense then that that was given to Scipio, he wields the same diplomatic independence, 
but it is just on a grander scale.  As Pompey begins receiving pirate prisoners who 
surrender as a result of his efforts, he begins settling them throughout the east in cities 
that had previously been depopulated and devastated.  After his successes, Pompey is 
granted even greater powers so that he holds imperium over land in the east just as he 
does at sea.  He then summons the many kings and princes of eastern kingdoms in order 
to manage diplomatic arrangements even those that were made by his contemporary 
Lucullus during the Third Mithradatic War.  Pompey also founds a number of cities and 
establishes a number of Roman territories, which would later have major involvements 
such as Judaea.  It is with this super command that Pompey is able to make a drastic 
impact on the organization of the eastern portion of the entire Roman Empire.110   
 Like the great generals to follow, such as Pompey, Scipio utilizes this military 
success as political leverage in order to surpass political limits of his day.  The first 
instance is Scipio’s return to Rome after successful campaigns in Spain in which he seeks 
both a triumph, which had never been done before by someone without a magistracy, and 
the election to Consul.  Though he is refused a triumph, he does march into the city 
displaying the large amount of silver he claimed in Spain.111  This sets the stage, 
however, for the later and truly grander triumph of his return from Africa, which Livy 
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compares to later triumphs raising the historic achievement of Scipio (Chaplin p. 294-
5).112  He is very successful, however, in his election to Consul as he not only wins, but 
Livy states “It is recorded, that this election was attended by a greater number of persons 
than any other during the war.  People had come together from all quarters, not only to 
give their votes, but also for the purpose of seeing Publius Scipio.”113  Though at this 
point, Scipio very much operates within the realm of precedent with his election to 
Consul, his military success has clearly had a dramatic effect on his popular support as 
his election apparently has the best attendance of any during the war despite the 
diminished population.  Soon after, lots are drawn for provinces for the following year 
and Scipio intends to challenge the Carthaginians in Africa to bring an end to the war.  
He is contested, however, by Quintus Fabius Maximus who questions Scipio’s age, 
experience, and motives for wishing to take Africa as his province.  Most of the senate 
believed if they refused Scipio, he would simply seek the matter from the people and so it 
is resolved that the tribunes will keep consistent with the senate’s decision.  Ultimately, a 
middle ground of sorts is agreed up as Scipio is assigned Sicily, but given the option to 
cross over into Africa should it benefit the state.114  Though Scipio does not achieve 
precisely what he planned for, his popular favor clearly did have an impact on the 
proceedings of the senate and in the end the possibility of his crossing into Africa is left 
open.   Scipio’s potential use of the tribunes is possibly anachronistic analysis on the part 
of Livy who had knowledge of similar situations with the Gracchi.  It is possible Scipio 
would not have challenged the senate to the point that he would have tried to supersede 
their decision by going to the people, but the fact alone that he ultimately is granted his 
goal despite the opposition in the senate indicates he did carry great political power at 
this point.   
Results of the War: the Winnings of an Empire 
 With Scipio’s final peace settlement with Carthage and the agreement between 
Rome and Macedon a few years previously, Rome enters a new age as the most powerful 
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power in at least the western portion of the Mediterranean if not the entire sea.  The result 
of Rome’s victory is first and foremost the territorial and economic gains that would help 
aid reparation of Italy after nearly 20 years of devastation as well as fuel the growing 
motivation at home to conquer.  The Romans now recognized place as one of the most 
powerful force in the Mediterranean meant that isolationist foreign policy in the east was 
nearly impossible.  The Romans also had difficulties avoiding western involvements as 
well as the precedent of long Spanish campaigns was set and the newly claimed lands in 
the west had to be defended.  Additionally, the actions of both the Gauls in the north and 
Rome’s allies primarily in the south of Italy lead to Roman action securing their rule in 
these areas.  Lastly, even the language of Livy’s account shows a marked change in the 
attitudes of the Romans towards their holdings.   
 The peace terms of Rome with Carthage and Macedon would have a dramatic 
effect on Roman actions in the near future with regards to foreign policy and military 
action.  The agreement with Carthage as stipulated by Scipio, as discussed previously, 
determined that all Roman prisoners, fugitives, and deserters be restored at no cost.  
Additionally, all Carthaginian armies had to leave Gaul and Spain, Carthage had to 
abandon claims to Spain and all islands between Italy and Africa, Carthage had to 
disband all of its navy with the exception of 20 ships, and finally Carthage made 
payments of wheat, barely, and silver to Rome.115  The terms also limited Carthage’s 
ability to make war, but overall were fairly lenient when compared to the later Roman 
treaties that annexed the conquered land because it allowed Carthage to maintain lands in 
Africa that had been owned before the war.116  The peace with Macedon, however, was 
made much more out of a stalemate than a victory as Rome agreed in 205 to peace in 
order to focus on finishing the war with Carthage.  The treaty makes no mention of 
reparations of either side indicating the First Macedonian War was regarded as a 
stalemate.  The treaty does assert the Romans now have claims of control over the 
Parthini Illyrians mentioning three of their fortresses by name: Dimale, Eugenium, and 
Bargulum.  The Macedonians on the other hand assert control over the Atintania in 
Epirus.  Though neither side loses territory from the other, both superpowers do assert 
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new claims over lesser groups.117  This furthers Rome’s foothold in the Balkans, which 
was begun with the First Illyrian War just before Hannibal’s invasion.   
 Nearly, immediately after the Second Punic War, a second war with Macedon 
broke out, one in which the full focus of the Roman military could be placed.  The origins 
of the Second Macedonian War lied in Macedon’s alliance with Carthage reportedly even 
to the point of sending troops to the battle of Zama.  Additionally, envoys from Rhodes, 
Athens, and Pergamum arrived with grievances against Philip, King of Macedon.118  
Already, more minor powers in Greece and Asia are sending envoys to Rome despite 
limited involvements.  This coupled with potential unfulfilled feelings from the first 
involvement in Macedon led to the ultimate Roman victory just three years after 
resuming the fighting imposing a heavy indemnity.  The indemnity levied against 
Macedon would be even heavier than the one against Carthage, but the terms still left 
Macedon, like Carthaginian Africa, intact.119  This would only be the first of countless 
conflicts including wars ending in 194, 188, and 168 that commanded Roman attention 
and ultimately expansion throughout the east all the way to Parthia.120   
 When Rome wasn’t involved in conflicts in the east, troops were continuously 
sent west to protect current territory and the allies that were earned during the Second 
Punic War.  As mentioned, Scipio received unprecedented diplomatic powers while 
abroad in Spain to procure relations with Syphax in Africa.  He also used them to secure 
relations with tribes in the area in order to sway the Iberian peninsula from the 
Carthaginians.121  After the war, Rome did reduce the number of troops left in Spain to 
about one legion, but added two praetors to govern Spain signifying a permanent Roman 
presence in the region.  Rome quickly had to increase the troop levels however as 
formerly loyal tribes, began revolting after it was clear Rome had become new rulers in 
the area.122  The revolt during Scipio’s bout of illness is indicative that the area was still 
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politically unstable,123 but the area would ultimately be under fairly firm Roman control 
in 178 with a Roman victory and a required fixed tax that covered the military cost of 
troops in Spain.124  Before the Second Punic War Roman expansion had been limited to 
Italy and the islands nearby in the Mediterranean with the exception of Illyria, which was 
primarily to address piracy issues.  After the war, however, Roman territorial claims 
extended into the mainland of both Spain and Greece, which were the major theaters of 
Roman wars for the next century.   Thus both the east and west expansion of the Roman 
Empire began as the result of conflicts that firmly begun during the Second Punic War.    
 Lastly, the results of the Second Punic War would allow Rome cement power 
within Italy itself especially in the northern areas with the Gauls and with allies who were 
disloyal during the war.  At the very start of the war, when Hannibal marched out of the 
Alps and into Italy he was  supplied and his army reinforced by Gauls hoping to chase 
out the Romans especially after his first victory at Trebia.125  Similar sentiments persisted 
even after the war as Rome sent armies north at varying intervals as late as 155 to put 
down uprisings.126  Thus issues on the Roman’s northern border and thus the entrance to 
Italy used previously by Gallic armies and Hannibal were addressed.  Various defecting 
Italian cities also allowed Rome to exercise control of these areas with little resistance.  
Capua, Tarentum, and Syracuse were the primary offenders to turn towards the 
Carthaginians, but even areas in the north such as Arretium had questioned loyalty during 
the war.127  It was Capua, though, whose betrayal was felt the worst as they were 
considered citizens and according to Livy they wished to rule Italy themselves.128  When 
ultimately captured back by the Romans, the punishment fit these feelings of betrayal as 
the remaining elite were executed by the conquering general Flaccus without senatorial 
decree.129  Rome would claim the land of these dead elites and ultimately sell the former 
Campanian territory to Romans.130  This enabled demonstration of further Roman control 
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in the region.  This control would extend so far that when the Campanians appealed to the 
Roman senate, the senate turned it over to the tribunes stating the Campanians were now 
in the power of the Roman people.  Syracuse, which was formerly independent, also now 
entered directly under Roman control131 and Tarentum was reclaimed killing any 
supporters of the Carthaginians during the battle or immediately after.132  These events 
allowed Rome to subdue Capua to lesser status where it would be unable to rival Rome 
for the foreseeable future, enforce Roman rule in Tarentum who may have still harbored 
some very deep resentments from its conquest in 272, and lastly Syracuse was reduced 
from an independent kingdom to another city in Roman controlled Sicily.  The 
heightened Roman control in these areas along with the colonies for veterans, such as the 
ones backed by Scipio in postwar politics, helped to cement a Roman presence by 
ensuring loyal communities were distributed throughout Italy.133  Evidence for the 
effectiveness can best be seen during the Second Punic War itself when Roman and even 
Latin colonies were some of the few areas to resist and at times hold out against Hannibal 
in southern Italy.   
 Lastly, these territorial conquests would have an effect on the concepts of 
imperium and provincia undermining their use as descriptions of personal roles, as they 
ultimately come to define empire.  Some the first recorded uses of imperium and 
provincia appear in the era of the Second Punic War and generally concern matters of the 
senate.  Livy is really one of the few useful sources for this purpose because he is one of 
the few surviving sources that would have used, directly or indirectly, the Annales 
Maximi, which provided details on the use of imperium and provincia during the 
Republic.  The other comparable source, Polybius, also isn’t usable for this period 
because he wrote in Greek.  In the late third century, the use of imperium is limited to the 
command of one man and provincia designates the area where his imperium is limited.  
Imperium was initially really only given to primarily consuls until during the Second 
Punic War as demonstrated by the opposition to the appointment of Scipio Africanus 
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when sent to Spain as a proconsul.134  The senate was still not completely comfortable 
with this though as evident when Scipio is denied his Spanish triumph for not holding a 
magistracy.135  This event also demonstrates the connection between imperium and 
triumphs in the fact that they both stemmed from the senate as the senate bestowed both 
honors and that a non-consular triumph had a dramatic impact on significantly improving 
the chances for winning the next consular election.136  The criterion that limited Scipio 
would be relaxed throughout the war though, as Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, Scipio’s 
successor in Spain, was granted an ovation upon his return to Rome and finally Lucius 
Furius Purpureo celebrated a triumph as praetor in provincia Gallia in 200 just after the 
war’s conclusion.  This trend continued however, with 18 non-consular triumphs taking 
place over the next 30 years after Furius primarily out of Spain.137  Thus after the Second 
Punic War, the effects of imperium, namely the limitations for celebration of a triumph, 
were relaxed.  Use of provincia also changed as a result of the war, once again, 
specifically with regards to Spain.  In 197, two praetors were sent to Spain to clearly 
establish the boundaries of two new provinciae.  They appear to set these boundaries 
fairly clearly, as shown by one of those praetors, Marcus Helvius, not receiving a triumph 
upon his return in 195 because he acted in the provincia of the other praetor.  This strict 
stance is not held however as multiple instances of praetors marching into one another 
territory and even an instance of the two preators campaigning together follows.138  Thus 
provincia, the term which described containing or limiting one’s imperium, was relaxed 
as officials acted farther abroad and began to act with their imperium outside of their 
assigned provincia as shown in Spain.   
Though not necessarily at quick rates, the use of these words continue to expand 
evident by their use by Plautus and Terence in comedies in 79 where imperium and 
provincia are used in humorous context for the duties of slaves or prostitutes.  This 
signifies the uses of the words was very mainstream and were not necessarily limited to 
the honor of political officials.  Around this same era, imperium begins being used in 
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context to Rome and the Roman people as whole considering their power over other 
peoples rather than the power of one man.  Once again, the use of imperium is expanded 
being used in context of the speeches of Cicero to slowly grow to represent the state as a 
general institution.  In that same context, provinica represents the area an imperium 
holder, but because imperium has grown to mean the state, provincia takes on the 
meaning of a Roman territorial acquisition.  It is not until the reign of Augustus in which 
the term imperium Romanum is used to finally signify our modern conception of the 
Roman Empire in that it is an area of Roman power, but with a distinctly geographic 
connotation.139  Though it was a long path for the terminology of empire to come about, 
the initial expansion of the qualifications for the use of imperium and provincia is in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second Punic War.  It was through an attempt to adjust to 
newly expanded territory and the challenges of adjusting language to fit a growing 
number of political positions and their more common existence in foreign lands, that the 
Romans developed their own concept of the Roman Empire.   
Conclusion: A Roman Empire Emerges 
 Though the effects are varied, the Second Punic War brought about a number of 
very influential changes throughout the Roman economy, military, political structure, and 
territory.  These changes, as has been shown from looking at Roman history before 
Hannibal’s invasion, were new precedents, but not unique occurrences as they would be 
persistent through the next two centuries and sometimes expanded until reaching 
breaking points at the end of the Republic.  Even Livy saw the last century of the 
Republic as so dreadful he hoped his writing may distract him from the memory, though 
he knew he could never forget them.  In most cases it would take the emperor Augustus 
to resolve these issues bring stability to the chaotic world, at least for a time, which the 
Roman Empire had become.   
 The characteristics of this transformation, as described, included the development 
of increasingly privately funded military operations by a minority that ultimately did not 
physically serve.  This was done by the forming of long term contracts with the publicani 
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which had the unintended effects of class conflict a century later in the commercial 
classes attempt for greater wealth and political representation.  The Second Punic War’s 
financial difficulties also led to the abandonment of the old coinage system of using the 
drachma in favor of the denarii and victoriatti, which indicated the beginning of a 
societal divide between citizens and soldiers.  Additionally, armies spent progressively 
longer terms abroad until armies because of the geographic distances.  This along with 
the large number of forces required by the Romans forced a relaxing of the typical 
recruiting methods leading to more decentralized recruiting that provided generals with 
greater independence.  This greater independence along with the need of soldiers for land 
after the war, which was a unique event because that level of devastation to Italy had 
never been seen before, led to the beginning of soldiers’ loyalties shifting from the state 
to their individual general.  This characteristic of the Roman military would resurface 
again in the first century BC.  One of these generals, Scipio Africanus, demonstrated such 
military success in the field that he achieved longer terms of command than any general 
previously as well as nearly complete diplomatic freedom in dealing with foreign nations.  
His military successes also enabled him to carry huge popular support and political power 
in Rome, though still within the Republican system.  In this sense, Scipio was among the 
first of the great generals that would lead the Roman army and the state, though he 
differed from those ambitious men in that they ultimately brought down the Republic.  It 
was all of these precedents and changes that perforated nearly every element of Roman 
society to make the changes that led to Rome’s position firmly atop the Mediterranean 
hierarchy 
Though the figures of Scipio and Hannibal especially, have often received 
extensive analysis, the effects of the Second Punic War as a whole has not received 
nearly the same attention.  Other scholarship in progress may aid in remedying this 
though.140  Though just an undergraduate thesis, this study has revealed that the Second 
Punic War does carry great effects further into the Republic’s history.  Future modern 
scholarship can be compared for their opinions of the length, extent, and source of the 
Second Punic Wars impacts.  For this thesis, it has been established many of these effects 
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progressed nearly two centuries contributing to the fall of the Republic. Thus reviewing 
this thesis and looking back at the Second Punic War itself, it appears of great historical 
irony that the Second Punic War, which was the Republic and senate’s finest hour 
showing the resilience, flexibility, and persistence of the system, that ultimately set the 
events in motion that would bring that same system crashing down.    
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Appendix 
The four photos shown below are from the fresco on the exterior of the exterior of the 
Tomb of the Scipiones that were taken during a site visit.  Figures 1 and 1a as well as 2 
and 2a are the same pictures, but the second has been edited.  The edits feature a red line 
to indicate the outline of the elephants that were more clearly seen in person because of 
the depth than in the picture.  The blue line is shown for the same reason of the lack of 
depth coming through in the picture and so the more recent layers needed differentiating 
from the lower layer of concern.   
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